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Cook: General Telephone

GENERAL TELEPHONE
COMPANY OF THE SOUTHWEST
v. FALCON: RULE· 23's
APPLICATION TO TITLE VII
I.

INTRODUCTION

A minority person comes into your office and complains of
his employer discriminating against him on the basis of his race
or national origin. He alleges, specifically, that he was denied a
promotion which was granted to several white employees with
lower evaluation scores, seniority, and qualifications.
You accept him as a client and file a complaint with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The
complaint alleges that the employer maintained a policy, pattern
and practice of employment which discriminated against both
your client and minorities as a class. You receive a right to sue
letter from the EEOC and bring a Title VII class action in the
federal district court. 1 At this juncture you will have to address
the issues of the scope and breadth of the prospective class, and,
more particularly, whether or not it will be possible to represent
1. A Title VII suit may not be brought in the district courts without first filing a
charge with the EEOC and receiving a right to sue letter therefrom. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(b) (1976) (NeceBBity and timelineBB of filing a charge with the EEOC); 42 U.S.C. I
2000e-5(k)(1) (1976) (Right to sue letter); 42 U.S.C. §22000e-5(f) (1976) (Enabling legislation giving the federal district courts sole authority to hear Title VII suits). See note 6,
infra.
Caveat: 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976) provides that when there is a qualified state
employment agency, a complaint must be filed there. The statute also provides that the
limitations period for filing with the EEOC is extended from 180 days to 300 days when
the aggrieved party has initiated a complaint with such agency. 1d. Section 2000e-5(c)
further provides that no charge may be filed with the EEOC until the expiration of 60
days after proceedings have been commenced with the state agency. If such state is a
deferral state, where the EEOC will defer any charge filed with it to the state agency,
then there is a trap for the unwary. In Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980), the
Supreme Court held that the effect of this deferral provision is to render untimely any
charge originally filed with the EEOC more than 240 days after the act complained of,
unleBB the state agency disposes of the charge before a total of 300 days has elapsed. 1d.
at 814 n.16. See also Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 923 n.2 (9th Cir.
1982).
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a class of both employees who were denied promotion as well as
applicants who were denied employment.
It was this latter aspect of class certification, whether or not
it is possible to allow an employee to represent a class of both
employees and applicants, which was before the United States
Supreme Court in General Telephone Company of the Southwest v. Falcon, but the Court in effect left that issue unanswered.1 This case note will summarize and discuss the outcome
and background of that case, along with the application of Rule
231 to Title VII actions.

Currently, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
courts are not required to include findings of fact and conclusions of law in orders granting or denying class certification! Be2. 102 S. Ct. 2364 (1982) (Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the court. Chief
Justice Burger concurred in part, and dissented in part.) The facts in the introduction to
this note are essentially those found in Falcon.
3. Rule 23 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Prerequisites to a cl88s action. One or more members
of a clasa may sue or be sued 88 representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of
all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or
fact common to the clasa, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
clasa, and, (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the c!asa.
Furthermore, the rule requires that the suit satisfy one of Rule 23(b)'s three subdivisions, but this only becomes relevant after Rule 23(a)'s requirements are met. See, P.,.,
Ladele v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 95 F.R.D. 198, 202 (E.D. Penn. 1982).
Rule 23(b) provides in pertinent part:
(b) Clasa Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained 88 a clasa action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a)
are satisfied, and in addition: • • . (2) the party opposing the
clasa has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the clasa, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the
clasa 88 a whole . . • .
Employment discrimination suits are regarded 88 Rule 23(b)(2) suits. See Wetzel v.
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 250 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011.
See also Fed. R. Civ. P. advisory committee note to the 1966 Rule 23 revisions, 39 F.R.D.
69, 102 (1966).
4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 provides that "Findings of fact and conclusions of law are
unneceaaary on decision of motions under Rules 12 or 56 or any other motion ...."
(emphasis added). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 notes of advisory committee on 1946
amendments. ("The last sentence of rule 52 (a) 88 amended will remove any doubt that
findings and conclusions are unneceasary upon decisions of a motion . . . except 88 provided in amended Rule 41(b).")
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cause of the complex nature of the law and facts involved in
class suits, this note will also suggest a requirement, possibly
through amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
that such orders make explicit, through written findings and
conclusions, the factors taken into account in the court's decision. Such a requirement would aid the courts in properly applying Rule 23 to Title VII. Moreover, written findings of fact and
conclusions of law would also provide the parties, especially the
losing party, with an articulated basis for the court's decision.
II.

RULE

23

AND TITLE

VII

Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a class action may be maintained by a party to a lawsuit
when: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the class are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class representative; and (4) the representative party will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class.&
Title VII was passed in order to abrogate the adverse consequences of employment discrimination}' Rule 23, therefore, has
5. See note 3, supra.
6. "The primary purpose of Title VII was to 'assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered
racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens.' " Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348 (1976). See also S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODB CONGo & AD. NBws 2355, 2515:
The failure of our society to extend job opportunities to the
Negro is an economic waste. The purchasing power of the
country is not being fully developed. This, in turn, acts as a
brake upon potential increases in gross national product. In
addition, the country is burdened with added costs for the
payment of unemployment compensation, relief, disease, and
crime.
National prosperity will be increased through the proper
training of Negroes for more skilled employment together with
the removal of barriers for obtaining such employment.
Through toleration of discriminatory practices, American in·
dustry is not obtaining the quantity of skilled workers it needs
A nation need not and should not be converted into a welfare state to reduce poverty, lessen crime, cut down unemployment, or overcome shortages in skilled occupational categories.
All that is needed is the institution of proper training programs and the elimination of discrimination in employment
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generally been liberally applied to Title VII actions because discrimination based on factors such as race, sex, or national origin
is, by definition, class discrimination. 7 The problem, however, is
properly defining the scope and breadth of the class so that it
falls both within the confines of Rule 23's four requirements and
still furthers the policies and objectives of Title VII. s
III.

THE "ACROSS THE BOARD" APPROACH

The Fifth Circuit adopted an "across the board" approach
to Title VII class action suits by allowing an employee, aggrieved
by a single employment practice, to attack many of the empractices ....
In response to this need, the Judiciary Committee incorporated Title VII into H.R. 7152.
See a130 County of Washington v. Gunther, 101 S. Ct. 2242, 2252 (1981), citing S. REP.
No. 867, 33d Cong., 2d Se88. 12 (1964); McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 800-01 (1973); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972);
Griggs v. Power Duke Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426-30 (1971) ("Congre88 provided for Title VII
... for class actions for the provision8 of [Title VII and) the objective of Congres8 in the
enactment of Title VII ... was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and
remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white
employees over other employees. ")
7. In Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969), in an oft
quoted passage, the court stated that a Title VII 8uit is necessarily a class action "as the
evil sought to be ended i8 discrimination on the basis of a class characteristic, i.e., race,
sex, religion or national origin." See Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 33 (5th
Cir. 1968) ("Whether in name or not, [a Title VII) suit is perforce a 80rt of class action
for fellow employees 8imilarly situated.") See a130 United States v. McDonald, 432 U.S.
385, 393, n.13 (1977); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1974).
8. Vuyanich v. Republic National Bank, 82 F.R.D. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1979) ("Indeed,
the body of Rule 23 law is virtually incomprehensible unle88 cases are viewed as fashioning distinct approaches for distinct substantive areas .... Therefore, this court ought
to apply the standards of Rule 23 to the purported class and its representatives with its
gaze leveled at Congre88' intent in enacting Title VII.")
The desirability of bringing Title VII suits via class action is enhanced by its inherent economy of litigation. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, (1979) ("Class action device saves the resources of both courts and the parties by permitting an i8Bue potentially
affecting every party to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule 23." rd. at 701.)
(No abuse of discretion in certifying a nationwide class.) See a130 Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1977); American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S.
538, 553 (1973). "[Rule 23) encompasses those cases in which a class action would
achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to
persons similarly 8ituated, without sacrificing procedural fairne8B of bringing about other
undesirable results." Advisory Committee Notes to 1966 Amendments to Rule 23, 39
F.R.D. 69, 102-03 (1966). The rule in fact codifies the older equitable procedure whereby
a single representative could represent an entire class. See Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v.
Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 363 (1920) ("For convenience, therefore, and to prevent a failure of
justice, a court of equity permits a portion of the parties in interest to represent the
entire body ...."); Smith et. aI. v. Swormstedt et. aI., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853).
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ployer's employment practices if there is an alleged underlying
policy of discrimination. 8
The "across the board" approach epitomizes the liberality
accorded to Title VII class suits because it allows an employee
discriminated against in hiring to attack not only the employer's
hiring practices but also its other employment practices, such as
transfer and promotion. 10 The Supreme Court has criticized this
approach because "conflict might arise ... between employees
and applicants who were denied employment and who will, if
granted relief, compete with employees for fringe benefits or seniority."ll This presumed conflict of interest is considered fatal
to broad class certification because a hiring class representative
would not fairly and adequately pursue the claims of other employed class members as is required by Rule 23(a)(4).11 But despite such criticism from the Supreme Court, the "across the
board approach" has been applied and adopted by the lower
courts. is For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently adopted the "across the board approach" in Jordan v.
County of Los Angeles. 14
Falcon came to the Supreme Court out of the Fifth Circuit,
which, at the time Title VII was passed, included the states of
Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi. 111 These
southern states are notorious for their history of discrimination,lS and therefore it is probably no coincidence that the Fifth
9. See notes 19 to 23 and accompanying text infra.
10. See note 22 infra.
11. 102 S. Ct. 2364, 2371 n.13 (1982).
12. See also East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); notes 24 to
31 and accompanying text infra. See also Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747 (1975) which
allows applicants denied employment due to unlawful discrimination to receive retroactive seniority. This, therefore, raises a potential conflict of interest between the applicants and the employees.
13. See note 22 infra.
14. 669 F.2d 1311, 1318-19, and n.l0 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded. 51 U.S.L.W.
3252 (1982). See also Gay v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen's Union, 549 F.2d 1330 (9th
Cir. 1977).
15. Former 28 U.S.C. § 41, amended Oct. 14, 1980, P.L. 96-452, § 2, 94 Stat. 1994
(Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980) (reduced the Fifth Circuit to
the District of the Canal Zone, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas).
16.
The frenetic pace and extent of change in race relations in the
past twenty years has dimmed the memory of what it was to
be a Negro citizen in the South in 1954. All public schools
were segregated [by law]; public accomodations were segre-
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Circuit was the first appellate court to review the application of
Rule 23 to Title VII in Oatis v. Crown-Zellerbach. 17
In Oatis, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that
because racial discrimination was by definition class discrimination, a broad application of Rule 23 to Title VII was thereby
warranted. 18 Later, the Fifth Circuit relied on Oatis in Johnson
v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. 18 and concluded that Rule 23
would permit "an 'across the board' attack on unequal employment practices alleged to have been committed by the [employer] pursuant to its policy of racial discrimination."20 In an
oft quoted passage the Johnson court stated that "[w]hile it is
true. . . that there are different factual questions with regard to
different employees, it is also true that the 'Damoclean threat of
a racially discriminatory policy hangs over the racial class [and]
is a question of fact common to all members of the class.' "21
Any alleged discriminatory policy was therefore perceived as
providing common questions of law and fact, and the typical
claims or defenses which satisfied the requirements of Rule 23.
Johnson, and the across the board approach, have continually
been cited with approval both inllll and out28 of the Fifth Circuit,
gated; only a minute percentage of registered voters was black;
and black public office holders were virtually non·existent.
Black families had less than one· half the median incomes of
white families, and illiteracy rates were appallingly high. The
black American in the South was a second class citizen, an ex·
ile in his own country.
F. READ & L. MCGOUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED xi (1978). See also 1964 U.S. CODE CONGo
& AD. NEWS 2355, 2513·17.
17. 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
18. rd. at 499.
19. 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
20. {d. at 1124.
21. rd.
22. Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 565 F.2d 895 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 835 (1978); Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1974) (Reaffirmed Johnson and
allowed a terminated employee to challenge racially discriminatory policies throughout
the employer's business.) In Carr v. Conoeo Plastics Inc., 423 F.2d 57 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 951 (1970), the court allowed rejected applicants to attack both the
employer's plant practices as well as hiring practices. The court stated that the "plain.
tiffs here seek equal opportunity for employment, and charge defendants with discrimi·
nating against them on account of race. There can be no serious question but that plain·
tiffs have the right to bring the action for themselves and others similarly situated.
Envisioning an equal opportunity for employment {the rejected applicants] have the
correlated right to enjoy nondiscriminatory practices within the plant." rd. at 65. (em·
phasis added). See also Doe V. First City Bancorp., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 562 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
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but the validity of the across the board approach was ostensibly
questioned, prior to thp-se cases, by the Supreme Court in East
Texas Motor Freight v Rodriguez. l •
In Rodriguez, three city truck drivers, allegedly wrongfully
denied transfers to more desirable routes, sought to represent all
Blacks and Mexican-Americans aggrieved by the employer's various employment practices. The district court found that the
employer's transfer policies were neutral, and dismissed the individual claims. Moreover, it dismissed the class claim because
the plaintiffs had never motioned the court for a class certification hearing and, to the court, this indicated that the plaintiffs
would not be adequate class representatives under Rule
23(a)(4).SII The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed
on this latter finding by reasoning that the trial court itself "has
an independent obligation to decide whether an action brought
on a class basis is to be maintained even if neither of the parties
moves for a ruling under [Rule 23] subsection (c)(I)."18 Stating
that Rule 23 should be liberally applied to Title VII suits, the
Fifth Circuit court then certified a class of Black and MexicanAmerican city driver employees covered by certain collective
bargaining agreements.I'
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. 18 The Court
stated that the standards of Rule 23 required that "a class representative ... be part of the class and 'possess the same interSee generally, How Far the Across the Board: The Permissible Breadth 01 Title VII
Class Actions, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 61 (1982) (Pre-Falcon).
23. Jordan v. County of Washington, 669 F.2d 1311, 1318-19 (9th Cir.), vacated and
remanded, 51 U.S.L.W. 3252 (1982); Barnett v. W.T. Grant, 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975).
24. 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
25. Id. at 404-05. The district court "stressed the plaintiffs' failure to move for a
prompt determination of the propriety of class certification, their failure to offer evidence on that question, their concentration at the trial on their individual claims, their
stipulation that the only i88ue to be determined concerned the company's failure to act
on their applications" and a conflict between the relief the plaintiffs sought and a seniority system recently approved by the membership of their union. Id. at 400. For the text
of Rule 23(a)(4), see note 3, supra.
26. 505 F.2d 40, 50 (5th Cir. 1974) (quoting 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 1785 (1972).) Rule 23 subsection (c)(l) provides that "[a]s
Boon 88 practicable after the commencment of an action brought 88 a class action, the
court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained."
27. Id. citing 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 26, § 1771 (1972); Bing V. Roadway Express Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 446 (5th Cir. 1973).
28. 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
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est and suffer the same injury' as the class members."iB Applying this test to the facts of the case as found by the trial court,
the Supreme Court reversed because the named plaintiffs were
not qualified for the line driver positions and Utherefore could
have suffered no injury as a result of the allegedly discriminatory practices. "80 The Court ruled that the plaintiffs u were ,
therefore, simply not eligible to represent a class of persons who
did allegedly suffer injury."8} The court added:
We are not unaware that suits alleging racial or
ethnic discrimination are often by their very nature class suits, involving classwide wrongs. Common questions of law or fact are typically present.
But careful attention to the requirements of
[Rule 23] remains nonetheless indispensable. The
mere fact that a complaint alleges racial or ethnic
discrimination does not in itself ensure that the
party who has brought the lawsuit will be an adequate representative of those who may have been
the real victims of that discrimination. at

IV. General Telephone Company 0/ the Southwest v. Falcon
In Falcon, an employee who was allegedly unlawfully denied
a promotion brought a Title VII suit and sought to have it maintained as a class action. The plaintiff alleged the facts set forth
in the introduction of this note, and the district court certified a
class comprised of Mexican-American employees and MexicanAmerican applicants not hired by the defendant. The district
court certified the class without holding an evidentiary hearing
on the class issues, and merely supported its order Uby the rul29. [d. at 403-04. This same interest and same injury test was first applied in
Schlesinger v. Reservist Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216 (1973).
30. 431 U.S. at 403-04.
31. [d. at 406. Note that the appellate court discounted entirely the district court's
finding of a conflict between the plaintiffs and the other class members because the appellate court concluded that the district court could have narrowed the class or broken it
up into subclasses, (see Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir.
1968» or it could have shaped the relief to avoid injustice. Citing Franks v. Bowman
Transportation Co., 495 F.2d 398, 414 (5th Cir. 1974).
32. [d. at 405-06. See generally Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 84 H-,!RV. L. REV. 1109 (1971). "The
Fifth Circuit's 'across the board' class action concept goes a long way toward effectuating
the public interest. But it nonetheless should not be applied before a careful examination
is made to be certain that the plaintiff really does fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the class for which he purports to act." [d. at 1220.
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ing of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., that any victim of
racial discrimination in employment may maintain an across the
board attack on all unequal employment practices alleged to
have been committed by the employer pursuant to a policy of
racial discrimination. "88
After granting the class certification motion, the district
court, in the liability phase of the trial, entered separate orders
with respect to the plaintiff and the class. The court found that
the defendant had discriminated against the plaintiff in promotion but not in hiring, and that it had discriminated against the
class in hiring but not in promotion. 84 The result reached was an
ironic dichotomy because the representative plaintiff's interest
was inversely related to the interests of the class. An employee
discriminated against in promotions but not in hiring was representing a class discriminated against in hiring but not
promotion. 81
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the defendant asserted two
principle arguments: first, "that the failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of certification" required reversal of
the class certification; and second, that the Supreme Court ruling in East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez foreclosed the
possibility of an employee representing applicants in a class
suit. 86 The appellate court rejected the first argument by stating
that "[i]f later evidence shows the decision to certify the class to
have been a correct one, there is obviously no need to have held
such a hearing."S? In other words, the court was stating that if
33. 102 S. Ct. 2364, 2368 (1982).
34. [d. at 2368. The reason the class certification hearing is separated from the liability issue is that: "[N)othing in either the language or history of Rule 23 ... gives a
court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to
determine whether it may be maintained as a class action. Indeed, such a procedure
contravenes the rule .... [It) is directly contrary to the command of subdivision (c)(l)
...." Eisen v. Corlise & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974).
35. 102 S. Ct. 2364, 2368 (1982). As to this resulting form of class representation, the
Court stated "the individual and class claims might as well as have been tried separately," and added, "It is clear that the maintenance of respondent's action as a class
action did not advance the 'efficiency and economy of litigation which is the principal
purpose of the procedure,' " citing American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S.
438, 553 (1974). See also note 8, supra.
36. 626 F.2d 369, 373-74 (5th Cir. 1980).
37. Id. at 374, citing King v. Gulf Oil Co., 581 F.2d 1184, 1186-87 (5th Cir. 1968).
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the decision to certify a class was correct, then the absence of an
evidentiary hearing was non prejudicial and irrelevant in terms
of appellate review.
The employer's second argument at the appellate level was
that Rodriguez foreclosed the possibility of an employee representing a class of both applicants and employees because the
promotion claim would necessarily lack a factual nexus with any
of the hiring claims, and therefore such a class would fail to satisfy the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23. sa
The employer argued that the certification of such a class would
violate the standard of Rodriguez because a plaintiff who had
been hired by the employer would lack the same interests and
same injuries as the applicants who had never been hired, and
therefore the plaintiff could not be a proper representative of
such a class. 811
In response to this argument, the Falcon plaintiff argued
that the Fifth Circuit had not interpreted the nexus requirement
of Rodriguez restrictively4° and cited Payne v. Travenol41 in
38. See note 3, supra. See also Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 578 F.2d 987, 99394 (5th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, 445 U.S. 940 (1980). Cf. Jordan v. County of
Los Angeles, 669 F.2d 1311, 1318-19 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 51 U.S.L.W. 3252
(1982) which stated:
Variations regarding qualifications and prior work records are
typically present in Title VII employment discrimination
cases. Where the common thread of discrimination is alleged
to weave through the defendant's employment practices, the
varying ways in which the alleged discriminatory policy affects
different class members, if at all, should not preclude class
certification .... As both the claims of the named representative and the claims of the class stem from the same practice
of the defendant and are based upon the same legal theory,
the required nexus is present. The existence of this nexus is
further demonstrated by the fact that the requested injunctive
relief will, if granted, inure to the benefit of the class and class
representative as a member thereof.
Id. at 1321-22 (citations omitted).
39. See, e.g., Scott v. University of Delaware, 601 F.2d 76, 87·88 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979)i Hill v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 596 F.2d 99 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 929 (1979). The validity of this argument may in fact be quite specious.
See, for example, Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins., Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972)i Waters
v. Hublein Inc., 547 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977)i Richardson v. Restaurant Marketing Assoc., 527 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Cal. 1981)i Work Environment Injury Under Title V//, 82 YALE L.J. 1695 (1973).
40. 626 F.2d at 375i see also cases cited therein, and Vuyanich v. Republic National
Bank, 82 F.R.D. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1979) ("Indeed, the purposes of Title VII counsel in
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support of its assertion that the across the board approach was
still permissible in the Fifth Circuit notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez ...a
In Payne, Black women brought an action against the defendant employer and attacked the employer's educational requirements for a certain job classification because the requirements allegedly had a disparate racial impact and lacked any
significant business necessity. The trial court sustained this argument and allowed the case to proceed as a class action. The
employer appealed, and at the appellate level argued that the
plaintiffs should not be allowed to represent a class which included those positions because the advanced education requirements only applied to one particular type of job for which the
class representatives were not qualified. This was rejected by the
appellate court:
Plaintiff's action is an "across the board" attack
on unequal employment practices alleged to have
been committed by Travenol pursuant to a policy
of racial discrimination. As parties who have allegedly been aggrieved by some of these discriminatory practices, plaintiffs have demonstrated a
sufficient nexus to enable them to represent other
class members suffering from different practices
motivated by the same policies."

The appellate court in Falcon agreed with the Payne holding and concluded that a class of both applicants and employees
would not be overly broad and could be represented by the
plaintiff. The appellate court in Falcon held that both plaintiff
and the class complained of a common injury based on discrimination because of their national origin, and that this commonality outweighed any dissimilarities which might arise by different
specific discriminatory practices (i.e. hiring and promotion) .....
favor of across the board representation. Recent Fifth Circuit cases have endorsed such
suits.") See also Jordan v. County of Los Angeles, 669 F.2d 1311, 1318-19 (9th Cir.),
vacated and remanded, 51 U.S.L.W. 3252 (1982).
41. 565 F.2d 895 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 835 (1978).
42. 626 F.2d at 375. Payne v. Travenol, supra note 41. See also Satterwhite v. City
of Greenville, 578 F.2d 987, 993-94 n.8 (5th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, 100 S. Ct.
1334 (1980); Ct. Local 194, Retail & Wholesale & Dept. Store Union V. Standard Brands
Inc. 85 F.R.D. 599 (N.D. III. 1979).
43. 565 F.2d 895, 900 (5th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted).
44. 626 F.2d at 375.
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The appellate court added that in addition to this "alliance" the
plaintiff had "showed a similarity of interest based on job location, job function and other considerations. ".11 The appellate
court concluded from this that "a sufficient nexus between the
plaintiff's claims and those of the class" were therefore present
and consequently the requirements of Rule 23 were satisfied. 48
From this ruling, the Supreme Court "granted certiorari to decide whether the class action was properly maintained on behalf
of both employees who were denied promotion and applicants
who were denied employment."·?
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, with one dissent which would have remanded the case for the class allegations to be dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the district
court erred in permitting the plaintiff to maintain a class action
on behalf of both employees and applicants. The Court found
that without gathering evidence on the class issues it was error
to presume that the individual's claim and the class claims
shared common questions of law or fact and that the individual's claim would be typical of the class. "Conceptually," the
Court stated, "there is a wide gap between (a) an individual's
claim that he has been denied a promotion on discriminatory
grounds, and his otherwise unsupported allegation that the company has a policy of discrimination, and (b) the existence of a
class of persons who have suffered the same injury as that individual" such that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) will be met. 48
The Court further noted that even though the "proposition underlying the across-the-board rule-that racial discrimination is
by definition class discrimination"-was a correct one, it concluded that this finding "neither determines whether a class action may be maintained in accordance with Rule 23 nor defines
the class that may be certified. ".9 The Court reasoned:
[E]ven though the evidence that [the plaintiff]
was passed over for promotion when several less
deserving whites were advanced may support the
conclusion that [Falcon] was denied the promotion because of his national origin, such evidence
45. [d. at 375-76.

46.
47.
48.
49.

[d. at 376.
102 S. Ct. 2364, 2369 (1982).
[d. at 2371.
[d. at 2370-71 (footnote omitted).
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would not necessarily justify the additional inferences (1) that this discriminatory treatment is
typical of [the employer's] promotion practices,
(2) that [the employer's] promotion practices are
motivated by a policy of ethnic discrimination
that pervades [thl:1 employer's work place], or (3)
that this policy of ethnic discrimination is· reft.ected in the [employer's] other employment
practices, such as hiring, in the same way it is
manifested in the promotion practices. eo

The Court noted that the district court erred by presuming
that the plaintiff had satisfied the requirements of Rule 23 without carefully evaluating the "legitimacy of [Falcon's] plea that
he is a proper class representative under Rule 23(a)."lIl The
Court stressed that a careful scrutiny of the facts was necessary
because a judgment by the court will become res judicata to the
class, and therefore significant unfairness would result "if the
framing of the class is overbroad."11 The Court concluded that a
class may only be certified, "after a rigorous analysis, that the
prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied."11

V.

CRITIQUE AND ANALYSIS

The holding in Falcon is quite simple- "that a Title VII
class action, like any other class action, may only be certified if
the trial court is satisfied after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied."" This simple holding instructs courts in fairly clear language to approach Title VII
class suits without any presumption of liberality.1I11 The lower
courts, however, are in conflict as to the broader significance underlying the Court's decision. For example, at least one court has
held that the across the board approach has received an imprimatur of approval through Falcon;lIe other courts have interpreted Falcon as merely requiring them to conduct an evidenSO. rd. at 2371. With regard to the court's conclusion that a plaintiff discriminated
against in promotion but not ·in hiring could represent a class discriminated against in
hiring but not in promotion, see note 35 and accompanying text, supra.
51. 102 S.Ct. at 2372.
52. rd.
53. rd. at 2373.
54. rd.
55. For the differing interpretations of this decision, see notes 60 and 61 and accompanying text infra.
56. Meyer v. MacMillan Pub. Co., Inc., 95 F.R.D. 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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tiary hearing on the class issues;1I7 still other courts have
concluded that the across the board approach can no longer be
condoned under the standard set forth in Falcon. 1I8
The two extreme interpretations of Falcon can be traced to
two conflicting passages in the Court's opinion. On the one hand,
the Court cited one of its previous decisions and stated that
"[i]n employment discrimination litigation, conflicts might arise,
for example, between employees and applicants who were denied
employment and who will, if granted relief, compete with employees for fringe benefits or seniority. Under Rule 23, the same
plaintiff could not represent these classes."119 However, in almost
the same breath, the Court continued:"Significant proof that an
employer operated under a general policy of discrimination conceivably could justify a class of both applicants and employees if
the discrimination manifested itself in hiring and promotion
practices in the same general fashion, such as through entirely
subjective decision-making processes."80
In Meyer v. MacMillan Publishing CO.,SI a district court
certified a class of both applicants and employees, and stated, in
a cavalier opinion, that "[w]hile we do not yet have the benefit
of further elaboration concerning the meaning of 'significant
proof [of] ... a general policy of discrimination,' we think that
the affidavits submitted by plaintiffs meet that standard."s2
Note that both in Rodriguez and in Falcon the Supreme Court
had condemned the practice of certifying a class by merely relying on the pleadings.ss Yet the Meyer court, in a sense, did just
this by finding the requisite "significant proor' in the plaintiffs
affidavits. Moreover, the Meyer court relied heavily on Falcon to
support its opinion that this was all still permissible. 8•
57. Wheeler v. City of Columbus, Mississippi, 686 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1982); Ander·
son v. City of Albuquerque, 690 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1982); McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d
62 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Meyer v. MacMillan, note 55, supra.
58. De Medina v. Reinhardt, 686 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Nation v. Winn-Dixie
Stores, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 82, 85 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Hawkins v. Fulton County, 95 F.R.D. 88,
92 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
59. 102 S. Ct. at 2371 n.13. Ct. Carr v. Conoeo Plastics, supra note 22.
60. [d. at n.15.
61. 95 F.R.D. 411, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
62. [d. at 415.
63. 102 S. Ct. at 2370-72.
64. 95 F.R.D. at 415-16. This case also allowed an exempt employee to represent
nonexempt employees, altho~gh this has been held to be impermissible in other cases,
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The Meyer interpretation of the Falcon holding, albeit a
minority interpretation at this time, is probably correct. If the
Supreme Court was intent on sounding a death knell for the
across the board approach, then it could have taken stronger action when the issue was before it. It could have dismissed the
class allegations of the plaintiff's complaint altogether, instead
of merely remanding the class issues for further consideration,"
and could have deleted the dicta which has been seized upon by
the Meyer court. This procedural aspect of Falcon, taken together with the dicta relied on by Meyer, leaves the practitioner
and the courts with a solid argument that the across the board
approach has not been affected by the Supreme Court's decision.
While at the time of this writing it is too early to forcefully come
to this conclusion, this aspect of the case does provide a viable
argument against an overly restrictive reading of Falcon.
VI. A SUGGESTION

The trial court in Falcon and the appellate court in Rodriguez were attempting to fashion broad relief in response to the
broader impact of race discrimination, which is, by definition,
class discrimination.ee Given the South's history, it is hard to
fault such judicial activism87 and liberal application of Rule 23
Bee, e.g., Nation v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 82, 86 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Ladele v.
Conrail, 95 F.R.D. 198 (E.D. Penn. 1982); Piva v. Xerox, 70 F.R.D. 378 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
65. Chief Justice Burger concurred in part and dissented in part. He concurred in
the general principles of the Court's discussion on the requirements of Rule 23, but with
regard to the decision to remand the caae for further consideration, he noted that Falcon's complaint of discrimination in promotion was an individualized plea not susceptible to class treatment. Noting that the principle behind class suits was economy and
efficiency of litigation, which would not, in his opinion, be advanced in the case before
the court, he would have remanded with instructions to dismiss the class claim. 102 S.
Ct. at 2373.
66. See notes 6 and 16, supra.
67. See notes 7 and 16, supra. See also Horn v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc.,
555 F.2d 270 (lOth Cir. 1977) discussing the numerosity requirement of Rule 23:
Why.was it important to give such stress to the requirement of
large number? Considering that the presence of the parties in
the class was unilnportant to the granting of injunctive relief,
this emphasis appears misplaced. We conclude that it did not
justify rejection of the class. There can be judicial notice that
employees are apprehensive concerning 1088 of jobs and the
welfare of their families. They are frequently unwilling to pioneer an undertaking of this kind since they are unsure as to
whether the court will support them. Even if they do prevail,
they are apprehensive about offending the employer as a result of taking a stand.
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to Title VII.88 However, one would be equally hard pressed to
find employers, and their amici curiae,89 who share this enthusiasm. Despite any assumed altruism on the part of the lower
courts, the fact remains that the Supreme Court has used both
Rodriguez70 and Falcon71 as opportunities to strongly criticize,
albeit by dicta, the across the board approach.
Justice Godbold, in his specially concurring opInIOn to
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, presented this caveat
with regard to the potential unfairness to class members bound
by res judicata to an adverse ruling against an overbroad class:
"[T]he error of the 'tacit assumption' underlying the across-theboard rule [is] that all will be well for surely the plaintiff will
win and manna will fall on all the members of the class."72
The holding in Falcon is intended to vitiate this potential
unfairness in the "tacit assumption" by requiring a rigorous
analysis of the case in order to ensure strict compliance with
Rule 23. If the courts are now required to hold an evidentiary
hearing and rigorously analyze compliance with Rule 23, why
should the courts not also be required to support their orders
granting the certification of a class with written findings of fact
and conclusions of law? While there is not much opinion on this,
it has been stated that:
Although the district court is not required to
make findings in deciding a motion of the type
here involved [Rule 23], we do think that where,
[d. at 275.
68. See notes 16, 22, and 60 and accompanying text, supra.

69. Note that only thirteen class members were found to exist in Falcon. Classes
with greater numerosity have been denied. See, e.g., Crawford v. Western Elec. Co., Inc.,
614 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1980) (34 class members not sufficiently numerous); Garcia v.
Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (31 class members not
sufficiently numerous). What was it that compelled the defendant, and amici, not to also
argue the numerosity issue when classes with far more numbers have been denied certifi·
cation solely on the basis of numerosity? This aspect of the case suggests that the defendant took the case up to the Supreme Court specifically seeking a restrictive ruling on
the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23.
70. Accord Shelton v. Parga, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298 (4th Cir. 1978); Local 194, Retail &
Wholesale & Department Store Union v. Standard Brands, 85 F.R.D. 599 (N.D. Ill.
1979).
71. See note 57, supra. Ct. notes 56 and 60 and accompanying text, supra. For an
intermediate reading of Falcon, see Ladele v. Conrail, 95 F.R.D. 198 (E.D. Penn. 1982).
72. 102 S. Ct. 2364,2372, citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d
1122, 1127 (5th Cir. 1969).
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as here, the district court is presented with conflicting positions of substance as to how,it should
exercise its discretion in determining whether to
permit a class action, it is salutary practice to give
the litigants, either orally or in writing, at least
minimum articulation of the reasons for its
decision. '78
It would be preferable, however, to take this salutory practice one step further and require a writing.'· Given that one of
the prime justifications for allowing the class action device, in
the first instance, is its inherent economy and efficiency of litigation,70 then the minimal effort taken to make written findings of
fact and conclusions of law should not significantly effect that
economy. Moreover, not only would the courts assure themselves
of going a long way towards fulfilling the Falcon requirements,
but also the courts might better shore up their decisions from
appellate attack, and ultimate Supreme Court review. For example, had the Falcon district court determined at an earlier date
that the certification of a class would result in an ironic inverse
representation,'8 then it could have ordered notice for intervention to go out to a more qualified representative of the class."
73. Interpace Corp. v. City of Philadelphia. 438 F.2d 401. 404 (3d Cir. 1971). See
also MANUAL POR COMPLEX LITIGATION, § 1.40, n.29 (4th ed. 1977).
74. Mr. Sam Kagel, Esq., a mediator/arbitrator, explains why he will unfailingly
provide a written opinion with his arbitration awards by way of example. Mr. Kagel was
once asked by a prominent owner of a national football team exactly what he did in
order to write an arbitration award. Mr. Kagel responded that he always writes his opinions with the losing party in mind because it will be that party who not only has an
interest, but also has a right. in knowing just why he lost. Drawing an analogy to football,
Mr. Kagel said that after a football game is over, it is the winning party who celebrates,
while the losing party stays in the clubhouse reviewing the video tapes. Similarly, if an
employer has a class certified against him, it is only fair that he should know why he lost
with particularity. Moreover, this ruling might put the employer on' notice so that it
might sooner correct its discriminatory employment practices. Interview with Sam Kagel
Esq., mediator/arbitrator, in San Francisco, California (January 31, 1983).
75. See note 8, supra.
76. See note 35 and accompanying text, supra.
77. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d) provides, in part:
In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court
may make appropriate orders: ... (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair
conduct of the action, that notice be given in such a manner as
the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step
of the action or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of
the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider
the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present
claims or defenses, or otherwise come into the action.
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CONCLUSION

The holding in Falcon requires the federal courts to hold an
evidentiary hearing on the class representative's Rule 23 qualifications. At least one reported case has held, in no uncertain
terms, that Falcon nevertheless expressly permits an across the
board approach to Title VII suits.78 Other courts have come to
an opposite, although questionable, conclusion. T' The fact is,
however, that it is possible to glean dicta from the opinion which
will support either conclusion.eo
A preferable alternative would be to require the courts to
issue written findings of fact and conclusions of law with any
order certifying a class. If a court's review of the facts, and its
sense of justice, compels it to accept an across the board attack
on the defendant's employment practices, then a careful scrutiny of the facts, or enlistment of the powers available to it,.1
should result in an order meeting the Falcon and Rodriguez
standards. In this fashion, a court might both advance its sense
of justice and remain within the parameters of Falcon.
Walter Cook·

See also note 31, supra.
78. See note 61 and accompanying text, supra.
79. See note 58, supra.
SO. See notes 59 and 60, supra.
81. See note 77. supra.
• Third year student. G9lden Gate University School of Law.
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